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One Man, Six Votes, and Many 
Unanswered Questions 
CUMULATIVE VOTING AS A REMEDIAL MEASURE 
FOR SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS IN PORT CHESTER 
AND BEYOND 
The nation looked on as voters cast up to six ballots for 
their favorite candidates in the June 2010 local government 
election in Port Chester, New York (the Village).1 For the first 
time in the Village, voters exercised an ability to stack votes for 
their preferred candidates—and a court-imposed remedial plan 
made this electoral system possible. Four years before, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a claim seeking to remedy 
what it perceived to be impermissible voting practices that led 
to the dilution of Hispanic votes within the Village.2 After 
litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, the DOJ prevailed in its claim against 
the Village.3 The court ordered that a new plan be employed to 
rectify past voting wrongs in Port Chester.4 Specifically, the 
court ruled that Port Chester’s proposed plan for an alternative 
system of voting, called cumulative voting, would be used.5 
This type of DOJ enforcement action is certainly not 
unique. The DOJ has filed a host of suits against jurisdictions 
it perceives to be in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
  
 1 Kirk Semple, First Latino Board Member Is Elected in Port Chester, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/ 
nyregion/17chester.html [hereinafter Semple, First Latino Board Member]; Kirk Semple, 
Trying to Make History, With 6 Votes Per Person, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A15, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/nyregion/12chester.html [hereinafter 
Semple, Trying to Make History] (“federal officials, civil rights scholars and the village’s 
political leadership” all watched the polls closely). 
 2 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); see also Semple, First Latino Board Member, supra note 1 (“A federal lawsuit filed 
in 2006 by the Justice Department, charged that the village’s method of electing its 
trustees diluted the voting strength of Latino citizens. A federal court judge agreed, and 
in 2009 ordered the imposition of a rarely used process known as cumulative voting.”). 
 3 Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 453. 
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Act of 1965,6 with an aim of earning minority voters in targeted 
jurisdictions fair representation.7 Section 2 is the crucial 
provision under which the DOJ brings claims against political 
subdivisions for vote-diluting practices. The section authorizes 
the courts or the litigating parties to develop remedial measures 
so that minority populations have the potential to elect their 
preferred candidate.8 Although the DOJ objected to the Village’s 
plan, it ultimately signed the consent decree after a court order, 
which established the new cumulative voting system.9 
The DOJ’s position regarding the implementation of 
cumulative voting—or other alternative voting systems10—is 
not new. Cumulative voting, a proportional system of 
representative voting that is more commonly used in corporate 
governance,11 has been implemented in dozens of jurisdictions 
nationwide in recent years, often as a remedial measure in 
settlement agreements for violations of the Voting Rights Act.12 
  
 6 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 7 See Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIV., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 8 See id. 
 9 Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
 10 Other alternative voting systems include “preference” or “choice” voting, 
and “limited voting.” Choice voting is a “proportional voting system used in at-large or 
multi-member district elections where voters rank candidates in order of preference.” 
Limited voting is a “plurality-majority system used in multi-member districts; electors 
have more than one vote but fewer votes than there are candidates to be 
elected. . . . [T]he candidates with the highest vote totals win[] the seats.” See Glossary, 
FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/fvo-
glossary (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). This note focuses on cumulative voting, but the 
DOJ has not readily approved these other alternative systems as remedial measures 
for section 2 violations either.  
 11 See Robert Brischetto, Cumulative Voting at Work in Texas: A 1995 Exit 
Survey of Sixteen Communities, FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 
http://archive.fairvote.org/index.php?page=529 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 12 See Richard Briffault, Electing Delegates to a State Constitutional 
Convention: Some Legal and Policy Issues, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1125, 1147 (2005) (discussing 
different settlement agreements adopting cumulative voting in section 2 lawsuits); Alec 
Slatky, Debunking the Myths about Port Chester, FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING 
AND DEMOCRACY (June 25, 2010), http://www.fairvote.org/debunking-the-myths-about-
port-chester (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). Cumulative voting garnered interest and 
attention after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and a 
subsequent line of cases, which instructed that racial gerrymandering was a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. Districts were left befuddled at how best to earn 
minority populations a fair vote in elections without drawing territorial lines that were 
impermissibly associated with race. See Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal 
Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 348-49 (1998) [hereinafter Mulroy, The Way Out] 
(explaining that the Shaw cases allowed for “less and less discretion for drawers of 
redistricting plans to draw districts that provide minorities fair electoral opportunities 
without running afoul of the Constitution”). The Shaw line of cases is discussed in 
more detail infra Part I.B. 
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Cumulative voting allows voters within a system to cast more 
than one vote for a favored candidate. Each voter is typically 
allotted as many ballots as the number of seats open in a given 
election.13 However, while the DOJ has been a signatory on 
consent decrees that effectually implement the system, it has 
never specifically advocated for cumulative voting as a cure for 
violations of the Act.14 Rather, the DOJ continues to push for 
single-member districts that comprise majority-minority 
populations as cures for defective, vote-dilutive procedures. The 
DOJ’s failure to readily sanction cumulative voting as a remedy 
for section 2 violations is problematic; it has led to public 
misconception and confusion within political subdivisions about 
how best to approach implementation of alternative voting 
systems like cumulative voting. And, in the wake of a recent 
Supreme Court decision,15 the DOJ’s refusal to identify 
cumulative voting as a cure narrows still the availability of 
potential remedies for section 2 violations.  
This note seeks to understand why the DOJ is wary of 
using cumulative voting to remedy violations of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, and advocates that the DOJ provide clear 
guidelines regarding the circumstances under which the 
system should be used. While cumulative voting received 
attention nearly fifteen years ago when single-member 
districts16 were challenged on equal-protection grounds, the 
public’s understanding of the system—and the DOJ’s stance on 
using the system—has not become any clearer. But in the wake 
of recent Supreme Court precedent, the fate of single-member 
districts is again unclear at best.17 As such, it is necessary to 
  
 13 See Glossary, supra note 10. 
 14 See Steven J. Mulroy, When the U.S. Government Endorses Full 
Representation: Justice Department Positions on Alternative Electoral Schemes, 
FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, http://archive.fairvote.org/ 
?page=542 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Mulroy, Full Representation] (noting 
that the DOJ has never “explicitly stated a policy regarding the appropriateness of 
these electoral schemes, except to say that they may be appropriate in certain 
circumstances to correct the problem of under-representation of minorities”). 
 15 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that crossover districts will not satisfy a prima facie vote-dilution cause of 
action under the first Gingles precondition and Section 2 and that the law does not 
mandate that crossover districts be drawn).  
 16 A single-member district is “[a] district from which only one member is 
elected.” See Glossary, supra note 10. 
 17 See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1254, 1258 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the preclusion of crossover districts as embodying an “opportunity to elect” will require 
political subdivisions to draw districts in accordance with race); see also Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative 
Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 125, 126 (2010) (noting that “‘race-conscious 
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revisit the possibility of implementing reasonable alternative 
systems, and it is necessary for the DOJ to be more flexible in 
its view of acceptable remedies for section 2 violations and 
embrace alternative systems where appropriate. Neither the 
DOJ nor the courts have provided sufficient guidance about 
when these systems might be appropriate as remedial 
measures. Indeed, scholars such as Steven J. Mulroy wrote 
about the DOJ’s unclear stance regarding cumulative voting in 
the 1990s, seeking to divine the circumstances under which the 
DOJ would support alternative systems of voting.  
Part I of this note provides an overview of the relevant 
Voting Rights Act provisions and the system of cumulative 
voting. Part II discusses a recent case, United States v. Village of 
Port Chester,18 as a relevant example of contemporary litigation 
and a model of the current implementation of cumulative voting. 
Part III seeks to glean an understanding of the DOJ’s position 
regarding cumulative voting. Part III also compares section 2 
and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, providing a snapshot of 
cumulative voting in the history of the DOJ’s preclearance 
system.19 Next, this part discusses potentially preclusive 
precedent, along with a recent decision that, from a policy 
perspective, should engender, but from a legal standpoint, might 
jeopardize, the existence of cumulative voting as a section 2 
remedy.20 Finally, Part IV proposes that the DOJ provide more 
detailed information about the availability of alternative voting 
schemes like cumulative voting for section 2 violations and 
advocates that the DOJ pronounce the circumstances under 
which the system may—or may not—be used. 
  
redistricting and the creation of effective minority districts’ . . . . might soon become 
quaint relics of an old and racist past,” and discussing the views of Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito); Richard Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority 
Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2007) (“Far from a ringing endorsement of 
the law of minority vote dilution, [League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) 
v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)] reveals a Court increasingly troubled by—indeed, more 
and more resistant to—the very concept of minority vote dilution and the 
accompanying legal requirement of ‘safe minority districting.’”). 
 18 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 19 Under section 5, “covered jurisdictions” seek approval from the Attorney 
General to change their voting systems to ensure they do not implement procedures that 
would likely have retrogressive effects. See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2011). 
 20 E.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); 
Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010). 
2011] ONE MAN, SIX VOTES 1673 
I. RELEVANT VOTING RIGHTS ACT LEGAL HISTORY 
Minority vote dilution litigation has a complex past. 
Since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, vote 
dilution claims have generated difficult analyses for the courts. 
As Justice O’Connor noted at the outset of one vote-dilution 
case, the Court was faced with “two . . . most complex and 
sensitive issues . . . : the meaning of the constitutional ‘right’ to 
vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to 
benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority 
groups.”21 The issues facing the courts today are similar, but the 
difficulty lies in a legislature’s ability to ensure proper ballot 
access to the electorate under the framework of the law. 
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: A Brief 
Summary 
On August 6, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed 
the Voting Rights Act into law.22 The Act’s passage “was an 
important step in the struggle to end discriminatory treatment 
of minorities who seek to exercise the most fundamental rights 
of our citizens: the right to vote.”23 When it was passed, the 
Voting Rights Act was controversial.24 Section 2 of the Act, 
however, was not criticized, since it was largely identical to the 
Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.25 In 
relevant part, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that 
“[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied . . . in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color . . . .”26 
  
 21 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993). 
 22 CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT 235 (1973). 
 23 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240. 
 24 Id. 
 25 The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, “The 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 
(1980) (noting that section 2 was “intended to have an effect no different from that of 
the Fifteenth Amendment itself”). 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). Section 2 originally prohibited practices 
“imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(1970). When the Act was amended in 1982, the section dispensed with any kind of 
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In 1986, in Thornburg v. Gingles,27 the Supreme Court 
construed section 2 as amended for the first time, providing a set 
of conditions to aid courts and potential plaintiffs in determining 
the boundaries of a section 2 violation.28 The preconditions set by 
Gingles still dictate the test that courts apply today.29 It is now 
well settled that minority vote dilution, in addition to simply 
denied access or abridgment, violates the Act.30  
The Supreme Court pronounced three “pre-conditions” 
in Gingles, which act as a gateway for all section 2 claims: (1) 
the minority group must be sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district; (2) the minority group must be politically 
cohesive; and (3) the white majority must vote sufficiently as a 
bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority’s preferred 
candidate.31 Only when these three conditions have been met 
does a court move on to determine whether there has been a 
violation.32 This analysis is based on the “totality of 
circumstances,” which includes factors envisioned by Congress 
when it passed the 1982 Amendments:33 (a) a history of official 
discrimination; (b) the extent of racially polarized voting; (c) the 
electoral practices that enhance opportunities for discrimination; 
(d) access to the candidate-slating process; (e) discrimination in 
other areas that hinders the ability of the minority group to 
participate effectively in the political process; (f) racial appeals 
  
“intent” requirement, and thus only attacked the “manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right to vote,” with a focus on the discriminatory effects. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1982 Amendments rejected the plurality view 
of City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 74, which required a plaintiff to show discriminatory 
intent. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71 (1986). The 1982 Amendments 
also outlined a test for determining whether a violation of section 2 had occurred. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006); see also Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241. 
 27 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 28 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-44, 50-51. 
 29 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51; see also Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241 (discussing 
and evaluating the necessary Gingles preconditions to establish a section 2 violation).  
 30 Vote dilution has long been considered violative of the Act, although 
certain Supreme Court Justices prefer a purely textual reading of section 2, which 
would preclude vote dilution claims altogether. Justices Thomas and Scalia have 
endorsed such a textual reading of section 2, whereby vote dilution does not establish a 
“standard, practice, or procedure” and thus should not be challenged under the Act. 
See, e.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 
874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 31 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. 
 32 See, e.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241 (“In a [section] 2 case, only when a 
party has established the Gingles requirements does a court proceed to analyze 
whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances.”). 
 33 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37; see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
1010-11 (1994). 
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in political campaigns; and (g) election of members of the 
minority group to public office in the jurisdiction.34 When a 
plaintiff proves a prima facie case of vote dilution under the 
Gingles preconditions, and the court further determines that the 
“totality of circumstances” is also met, the defendant political 
subdivision must implement a cure for the violation.  
B. The Traditional Cure for a Section 2 Violation: Single-
Member Districts 
Since the Court’s decision in Gingles, the traditional 
remedy employed for section 2 violations is the drawing of 
single-member districts. Single-member districts within a 
political subdivision are typically implemented as a cure for the 
at-large, “winner-take-all” election practices that are 
challenged under section 2.35 In an at-large election, each voter 
may cast one vote for the number of empty seats, and the 
candidates who receive the most votes fill the positions.36 This 
was the system that existed in Port Chester prior to the 
implementation of cumulative voting, and it is often the system 
challenged in section 2 actions.37 At-large voting systems do 
require heightened review by the DOJ and are usually the 
subjects of section 2 claims because they tend to squash the 
minority vote.38 Essentially, the minority vote’s strength is 
diluted because the majority votes as a bloc to fill vacancies.39 If 
a section 2 violation is found after litigation, the courts usually 
  
 34 See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1010 & n.9 (summarizing factors from the 
Senate Report regarding the 1982 Amendments for a section 2 claim). 
 35 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 338, 362 (“An oft-repeated 
principle in voting rights cases is that single-member districts are ‘strongly preferred’ 
to at-large plans for court-ordered . . . remedies.”). 
 36 See id. at 336. 
 37 See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets 
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 708-09 (2006). 
 38 See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT 277, 302 n.13 (David L. Epstein et al., eds. 2006); see also Peyton McCrary, 
Christopher Seaman & Richard Valelly, The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing Section 5, 
in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra, at 20, 24 (noting that in the context 
of section 5 preclearance submissions, changes from single districts to at-large elections 
could be retrogressive in effect). 
 39 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 337-38 (“Voting rights 
jurisprudence has long acknowledged . . . that wherever minority and majority groups 
have differing voting patterns, the winner-take-all at-large method tends to dilute 
minority voting strength, because the majority group tends to vote as a bloc to fill all 
the available seats. This phenomenon is known as ‘vote dilution.’ Courts have also 
recognized that such features as numbered posts, staggered terms, and majority vote 
requirements can exacerbate the at-large method’s dilutive effect.”). 
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mandate that single-member districts be drawn to encompass a 
group that is geographically compact enough to elect its 
candidate of choice and thus eradicate the harm of the “winner-
take-all” system—the very requirement that exists in the first 
Gingles precondition.40  
The courts and the DOJ have certainly articulated their 
preference for single-member districts, especially in early 
Voting Rights Act jurisprudence.41 Supreme Court decisions 
also evidence districting as a means to give minorities more 
voting influence, as does the Supreme Court’s use of single-
member districts as a benchmarking tool to determine liability. 
While they are the popular and presumptive remedy for 
a section 2 violation, single-member districts that create 
geographic compactness of minorities—as required, too, by the 
first Gingles precondition—became hypersensitive to 
constitutional attack in the 1990s, and continue to be 
scrutinized today.42 In the seminal case Shaw v. Reno,43 the 
Supreme Court held that districts drawn according to race are 
subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court later determined 
that strict constitutional scrutiny is applied whenever “race 
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s 
decision to place a significant number of voters within or 
without a particular district.”44 Thus, while single-member 
districts redress the problems of at-large, winner-take-all 
systems by giving a minority group potential power in 
  
 40 See id. at 363 (“By requiring plaintiffs to show they are numerous and 
compact enough to draw a single-member district as a threshold matter in order to find 
liability, Gingles arguably implies that the universe of [s]ection 2 remedies is limited to 
single-member districts. Indeed, the Court notes that single-member district systems 
are generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority group 
potential to elect because it is the smallest political unit from which representatives 
are elected.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41 See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1975) (discussing the 
Court’s preference for single-member districts). 
 42 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Voting Rights and 
Elections: Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 249 
(1995); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1258 (2009) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that to meet a threshold large enough to constitute a minority’s 
opportunity to elect, a state will be forced to use race-conscious measures, which will 
leave it vulnerable to equal-protection challenges).  
 43 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding that where a district is drawn that is so 
oddly shaped as to be “irrational on its face . . . it can be understood only as an effort to 
segregate voters into separate voting districts,” and is subject to strict scrutiny). Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), foreclosed the notion that a mapped district would have to 
look irrational on its face to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 912. 
 44 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 920 (explaining that a “congressional redistricting 
plan cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny, [the] most rigorous and exacting 
standard of constitutional review”); see also Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 241.  
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geographic compactness, racial districting as a practice is 
subject to strict scrutiny as a kind of “reverse” discrimination.45  
Indeed, the decision in Shaw along with its progeny has 
curtailed the ability of a political subdivision to draw majority-
minority districts, leaving those subdivisions that do 
implement these districts vulnerable to equal-protection 
challenges.46 The Shaw line of cases, as an extension of the 
equal-protection doctrine, asserts that district-drawing to 
obtain a certain number of minorities of voting age within a 
given district does nothing more than “reinforce the ideas that 
the racial group thinks alike, shares the same political 
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”47 As 
a result, race cannot be the predominant factor in configuring a 
district, which obviously creates tension between the cause of 
and cure for dilution.48 
After Shaw, political subdivisions and scholars 
struggled to develop solutions to cure vote dilution without 
running afoul of Shaw and the Equal Protection Clause. Many 
in the legal academy explored the benefits of coalitional, or 
“crossover,” districts as remedies for section 2 violations.49 A 
  
 45 See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining 
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208-09 (2003). The Court’s 
reluctance to readily sanction majority-minority districts in light of Shaw and its 
progeny has sparked debate within the academic community regarding remedial 
measures. Influence and coalitional or crossover districts were viewed initially as 
viable alternatives. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 412 (2006), and Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1247-49, held, however, that influence and crossover districts, respectively, cannot 
be used to prove vote dilution (and thus, by implication, cannot be used as a legally 
imposed remedy for section 2).  
 46 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 346 (discussing racial 
gerrymandering and equal-protection violations).  
 47 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993); see also Mulroy, The Way Out, 
supra note 12, at 347.  
 48 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-17. As Steven J. Mulroy notes, the 
“Shaw/Miller cases and their progeny . . . create a dilemma for anyone interested in 
drawing fair electoral districts. The Voting Rights Act requires that race be taken into 
account when drawing districts, but the Shaw cause of action requires that race not be 
used ‘too much.’” Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 348. 
 49 See Yishaiya Absoch, Matt A. Barreto & Nathan D. Woods, An Assessment 
of Racially Polarized Voting for and Against Latino Candidates in California, in 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, 
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 107, 108 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007); Note, The Future of 
Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 
45, at 2228; see generally Luke P. McLoughlin, Note, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional 
Districts, Party Primaries and Manageable Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 312 
(2005). Scholars found support for the coalitional district as a remedy to section 2 
violations in Supreme Court precedent. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 
(2003) (“[S]tudies have suggested that the most effective way to maximize minority 
voting strength may be to create more influence or coalitional districts.”); Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 90 n.1 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]hen the candidates 
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crossover district is a district in which the group of minority 
voters makes up less than a majority of the voting-age 
population, but in which the minority population is big enough 
to elect its candidate of choice with help from voters who are 
members of the majority that “cross over” to support the 
minority group’s candidate of choice.50 Crossover districts were 
thought to be “superior to majority-minority districts because 
the smaller the number of minority voters required per district, 
the smaller the need to disregard traditional districting 
principles and the less likely that a court will invalidate a 
newly drawn district on equal-protection grounds.”51  
While crossover districts seem to embody the spirit of 
the Voting Rights Act and breed coalitional unity between 
minority and majority voters in order to elect a minority 
group’s preferred candidate, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Bartlett v. Strickland that the Voting Rights Act did not 
provide a cause of action for those minority voters who could 
elect a candidate of choice with even a small crossover vote 
from the white majority.52 Bartlett thus established that, for the 
purposes of the first Gingles precondition, single-member 
benchmark districts drawn for establishing liability must 
comprise more than a fifty percent minority voting age 
population (VAP) or citizen voting age population (CVAP).53 
Crossover districts would have enlarged the scope of section 2 
claims—and available court-ordered remedies. But Bartlett 
foreclosed this ability. The DOJ and other individuals with 
  
preferred by a minority group are elected in a multimember district, the minority group 
has elected those candidates, even if white support was indispensible to these victories.”). 
 50 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1242 (2009) (describing 
crossover districts). 
 51 Absoch et al., supra note 49, at 108.  
 52 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1246 (plurality opinion) (holding that the first 
Gingles precondition requires a showing that the minority population in a majority-
minority district makes up more than fifty percent VAP/CVAP, and that majority-
minority districts are only required by law if all three Gingles factors are met).  
 53 See id. at 1246-47. Before Bartlett, some courts had applied a fifty percent 
numerical threshold for the sake of ease; the precise number of majority voters within 
a district was a question left open in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See, e.g., 
McLoughlin, supra note 49, at 319. The Bartlett Court did not address specifically 
whether the numerical applied to VAP or CVAP. Pre-Bartlett, many circuit courts used 
CVAP as the appropriate metric. See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to 
Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
755, 779 (2011). In a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case post-Bartlett, the court 
recognized CVAP as the appropriate measure, and also asserted that while Bartlett did 
not address the question head-on, the opinion’s language indicates that CVAP is the 
applicable population nonetheless. See Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, 586 F.3d 1019, 
1023-24 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Persily, supra, at 779. 
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standing cannot now challenge perceived vote-dilutive practices 
under section 2 based on the minority population’s potential to 
elect in a crossover district, nor can the court order what might 
have been this more race-neutral remedy.54 Bartlett therefore 
resurrects the concerns of Shaw to some extent, as single-
member districts must be drawn to encompass an exact 
majority percentage of minorities in order to satisfy Gingles—a 
practice that seems Voting-Rights-Act-retrogressive in itself.55 
But the Bartlett Court noted that requiring crossover districts 
for section 2 violations would breed even more race-conscious 
district drawing.56 Without crossover districts as a viable 
challenge-worthy scheme or court-mandated remedy for vote 
dilution after Bartlett, it is time again to explore alternative 
forms of democratic representation that can cure section 2 
violations. Cumulative voting can be used as such a remedy.  
C. Cumulative Voting: An Alternative Electoral Process 
Cumulative voting is a method of at-large election 
voting where every voter gets as many votes as there are seats 
for the open posts in a given election, and voters can distribute 
their ballots as they please.57 That is, “under cumulative voting, 
a voter may distribute votes among candidates in any 
  
 54 See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349, 
370-71 (2010). 
 55 See id. at 370 (“Bartlett highlights how scaling back a remedy may produce 
perverse effects. . . . [T]he Justices cut off an application of the statute that promised to 
encourage the type of political participation the Court has long claimed it wants to 
promote—namely, the type that yields cross-racial coalitions. At the same time, the 
Justices restricted the statute’s reach to protect the type of participation they most 
dislike—namely, that secured by the majority-minority district.”). It should be noted 
that the Court did not admonish the drawing of such districts—it encouraged them in 
so far as coalition voting would foster communication of races. Political subdivisions 
could draw such districts on their own, of course, but such a coalition district could not 
be used to draw a remedial plan to prove voter dilution pursuant to the first Gingles 
precondition. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248.  
 56 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1249. 
It would be an irony, however, if [section] 2 were interpreted to entrench racial 
differences by expanding a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in 
American politics. Crossover districts are, by definition, the result of white 
voters joining forces with minority voters to elect their preferred candidate. The 
Voting Rights Act was passed to foster this cooperation. We decline now to 
expand the reaches of [section] 2 to require, by force of law, the voluntary 
cooperation our society has achieved. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 57 See Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative 
Election Systems, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 654-57 (1978). 
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combination, even distributing all votes to one candidate.”58 
Cumulative voting embodies a type of proportional 
representation.59 In predicting the election outcome for a 
minority group under cumulative voting, a simple calculation 
of the “threshold of exclusion” is used. The threshold of 
exclusion is calculated as “one” divided by “one more” than the 
number of seats to be filled. Therefore, in a cumulative voting 
system, in order for a minority population to have a realistic 
opportunity to elect its preferred candidate, that minority 
population must make up greater than “1 / n+1” of the 
population, where “n” is equal to the number of seats up for 
election.60 The resultant number of this formula is the 
“threshold of exclusion.”61 This number is equal to the 
percentage of votes that any group of voters must exceed in 
order to elect a candidate of its choice, regardless of how the 
rest of the voters cast their ballots. The system allows “a 
numerical minority to concentrate its voting power behind a 
given candidate without requiring that the minority voters 
themselves be concentrated into a single district.”62 The Equal 
Protection Clause is thus not implicated by cumulative voting.  
In practice, cumulative voting is more commonly 
associated with corporate governance and has been used to 
elect members to corporate boards.63 But cumulative voting has 
also been used in the political arena. From 1870 to 1980, 
Illinois used cumulative voting to elect members of its general 
assembly.64 The cumulative voting scheme has also been used to 
elect minority-preferred candidates in communities in Illinois, 
Alabama, North Carolina, South Dakota, and more than two 
  
 58 Brischetto, supra note 11; see also Zimmerman, supra note 57, at 654. 
 59 See Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not 
Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 327, 375 (2006). 
 60 See, e.g., Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 341 (outlining calculation 
for the threshold of exclusion). 
 61 See id. 
 62 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 910 n.15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 63 See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 232-33 
(1989) (“Surprisingly, although cumulative voting is quite widespread in elections for 
corporate boards of directors, it has been used rarely in elections for political office.”); 
see also Brischetto, supra note 11 (“Cumulative voting has . . . been used for decades to 
elect members of many corporate boards of directors.”).  
 64 Brischetto, supra note 11. 
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dozen local political subdivisions in Texas.65 While cumulative 
voting has been effective in these places,66 it should be noted that 
cumulative voting is often considered more advanced than voting 
in single-member districts; it requires that “voters understand 
how to navigate the system and turn out to cast their ballots in 
sufficient number to elect a candidate preferred by the minority 
but not the majority of voters,” and studies have shown that this 
does not always happen.67 Voters need to be educated in how best 
to “plump” their votes, and vote cohesively for their candidate of 
choice. And while it has been called controversial, no court has 
found cumulative voting unconstitutional. 
D. Cumulative Voting Has Never Been Ruled Illegal by 
Federal Courts—But Dicta Has Sent Mixed Messages 
While cumulative voting schemes have typically been 
implemented as settlement agreements between litigating 
parties in section 2 actions,68 no case has held that cumulative 
voting is an illegal or unconstitutional remedial measure for 
violations of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.69 Although, as the 
Port Chester Court noted, the DOJ would have liked the court to 
“believe that cumulative voting has been consistently rejected as 
a remedy to a section 2 violation,”70 this is not entirely true.  
  
 65 See Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting, 
FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, http://archive.fairvote.org/ 
index.php?page=2101 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
 66 See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 301 (discussing cumulative 
voting in Chilton County, Alabama, and noting that “[c]umulative voting has been 
quite effective, even in the face of racially polarized voting, at bringing about minority 
representation—not just for racial minorities, but for women and political minorities as 
well”); see also Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 349 (discussing cumulative 
voting successes in different political subdivisions). 
 67 Katz, supra note 54, at 384. 
 68 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 346 (noting that alternative 
electoral systems started to come about as settlement agreements in the 1980s). 
 69 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“There is no case law that rejects cumulative voting as a lawful remedy under the 
Voting Rights Act. Recently, a district court in the Northern District of Ohio did exactly 
what Port Chester is asking of the Court in this case: it accepted the defendant’s proposal 
for limited voting instead of the plaintiffs’ districting plan to remedy a [s]ection 2 
violation.”). As a note, the DOJ also submitted arguments to oppose the Ohio 
jurisdiction’s proposed remedy of cumulative voting. See generally United States 
Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City School Board’s Proposed Remedies, United 
States v. Euclid City Sch. Dist., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No. 08-cv-2832) 
[hereinafter U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City Sch. Dist.]. 
 70 Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
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1. Cases That Note the Permissibility of Cumulative 
Voting as a Cure 
Importantly, a few cases have noted the possibility that 
cumulative voting could serve as a potential cure for vote 
imbalances. For example, in Holder v. Hall,71 Justice Thomas 
noted in his concurring opinion that the implementation of 
alternative voting systems  
may seem [like] radical departures from the electoral systems with 
which we are most familiar. Indeed, they may be unwanted by the 
people in the several States who purposely have adopted districting 
systems in their electoral laws. But nothing in our present 
understanding of the Voting Rights Act places a principled limit on 
the authority of federal courts that would prevent them from 
instituting a system of cumulative voting as a remedy under 
[section] 2 . . . .72 
Similarly, in Branch v. Smith,73 Justice O’Connor stated 
that “a court could design an at-large election plan that awards 
seats on a cumulative basis, or some other method that would 
result in a plan that satisfies the Voting Rights Act.”74 One 
court mandated a cumulative voting system for County 
Commissioner elections. It ruled that “primary elections would 
be conducted using the electoral districts submitted in the 
County’s second proposed remedial plan and that the general 
election would be conducted on a countywide basis using 
cumulative voting.”75 On appeal, this scheme was found to be 
impermissible, but only because the lower court did not consider 
the preference of the defendant and give deference as required.76  
  
 71 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
 72 Id. at 910 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also noted that: 
districting is merely another political choice made by the citizenry in the 
drafting of their state constitutions. Like other political choices concerning 
electoral systems and models of representation, it too is presumably subject to a 
judicial override if it comes into conflict with the theories of representation and 
effective voting that we may develop under the Voting Rights Act. 
Id. at 911. 
 73 538 U.S. 254, 309-10 (2003). 
 74 Id. at 309-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the fact that at-large 
elections can be remedial for violations of section 2 or section 5, so long as they provide 
appropriate representation with respect to population). 
 75 Cane v. Worcester Cnty., Nos. 95-1122, 95-1688, 1995 WL 371008, at *2-3 
(4th Cir. June 16, 1995). 
 76 Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
court abused its discretion in imposing the preferred voting system of the plaintiff—
cumulative voting). 
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The Port Chester Court also ordered that the system be 
used as a cure. The new voting system in Port Chester is currently 
the only court-imposed (as opposed to simply court-ratified), still-
viable remedial cumulative voting scheme in existence. 
These decisions show that federal courts—and even the 
Supreme Court—are willing to sanction alternative electoral 
schemes. 
2. Cases That Cast Doubt on Cumulative Voting as a 
Cure 
Other courts have been reluctant to support cumulative 
voting as a remedial measure. Indeed, in certain contexts, 
while not striking cumulative voting down as illegal, circuit 
courts of appeals have determined that cumulative voting is, at 
times, an inappropriate remedy for section 2 violations.  
For example, in Cousin v. Sundquist,77 at issue was the 
alleged dilution of the African American vote in the election of 
judges in Hamilton County, Tennessee. After cumulative voting 
was ordered by the district court, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court because it was not 
convinced that a violation had even occurred.78 But this did not 
stop the court from discussing its views about cumulative 
voting: “[W]e feel that cumulative voting, the remedy ordered 
by the district court in this case, is an inappropriate remedy for 
a section 2 claim, and especially so when imposed on the 
election of state court judges.”79 The court also asserted that 
cumulative voting “would encourage racial bloc voting,” and 
warned the system had the potential to entrench factions in the 
judiciary.80 The court concluded that the system would increase 
competitiveness to obtain as many votes as possible, vitiating 
collegiality among judges on the bench, and would be a 
movement towards proportional representation—something 
the court admonished.81 
In Dillard v. Baldwin County Commissioners,82 the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
cumulative voting system that Dillard sought was not an 
  
 77 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 78 Id. at 821-22. 
 79 Id. at 829. 
 80 Id. at 830-31. 
 81 Id.  
 82 376 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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appropriate section 2 remedy. The district court had recognized 
that “there [was] no objective and workable standard for 
choosing [it as a] reasonable benchmark[ ] over the many forms 
of government.”83 The court also noted that the first Gingles 
precondition is not without limitations: the federal courts could 
not concoct any remedy they so chose if the remedy had never 
been contemplated before by the state.84 Thus, while circuit 
courts have discussed an apprehension about implementing 
cumulative voting as a remedial cure based on case-specific 
facts—like the nature of judicial elections—no court has 
determined that cumulative voting by its nature is illegal as a 
cure.85 These mixed messages on cumulative voting as a remedial 
measure offer little aid in trying to assess the potential of 
implementing cumulative voting for section 2 violations.  
  
 83 Id. at 1264 (internal quotations omitted). 
 84 Id. at 1268. Indeed, the question of a reasonable benchmark has been a 
trying consideration for the judiciary. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880-81 (1994) 
(“In certain cases, the benchmark for comparison in a [section] 2 dilution suit is 
obvious. The effect of an anti-single-shot voting rule . . . can be evaluated by comparing 
the system with that rule to the system without that rule. But where there is no 
objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to 
evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows that the voting practice cannot be 
challenged as dilutive under [section] 2.”) (emphasis added). 
 85 Two recent cases might have provided further insight into the dilemma of 
whether cumulative voting should be used as a remedial measure for section 2 
violations. Unfortunately, neither case reached the merits. In another of the “Dillard” 
cases, Dillard v. Chilton County Commission, 495 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit faced a challenge by two litigants who sought to 
eradicate the consent decree that mandated cumulative voting as a section 2 remedy on 
the ground that Alabama law precluded the system. While the district court had 
upheld the challenge and determined that cumulative voting was not an appropriate 
remedial measure, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment because 
the challengers lacked standing. Id. at 1339-40. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
disposed of a litigation that had been pending in one form or another before the court 
for nearly 20 years—the decision was pending because of individuals’ refusal to accept 
the cumulative voting system. Id. at 1327-28. And even more recently, in Cottier v. City 
of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2010), Native Americans brought suit under 
section 2, claiming that districts had been drawn in such a way that their votes were 
diluted. In Cottier, the district court ruled that a violation had occurred, and imposed 
the defendants’ third proposed remedial plan: cumulative voting. Id. at 555-56. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 556. However, on appeal and after a rehearing, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that a violation of 
the Act had not been proved to begin with, and so never reached the question of 
whether cumulative voting was an appropriately imposed remedy by the Court. Id. at 
561; see also Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1994) (court “not 
called upon to outline whether facts and circumstances might justify the imposition of 
a cumulative voting plan on a political subdivision,” and review was limited to the 
specific facts and circumstances where the district court abused its discretion in 
adopting the cumulative voting scheme). 
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II. THE SECTION 2 ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN PORT CHESTER 
Courts have not provided clear guidance about whether 
cumulative voting is an appropriate remedial measure for 
section 2 violations, but the section 2 enforcement action in 
Port Chester provides more insight into the DOJ’s position 
regarding implementation of the system. Until 2006, the 
Village of Port Chester, New York, had an electoral system that 
used at-large voting to elect six members of a Board of Trustees 
(the Board). Every year, the Village’s voters elected two of the 
Board’s members for three-year terms.86 Under this system, 
each voter was permitted two votes for each calendar year.87 He 
or she could cast one vote for two separate candidates or, 
alternatively, he or she could cast one vote for a single 
candidate and withhold the other vote.88 Port Chester, with a 
population of 27,867, has a plurality of Hispanics who comprise 
46.2% of the Village’s total population; non-Hispanic whites 
make up 42.8% of the total population.89  
In December 2006, the United States sued the Village of 
Port Chester in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, alleging violations under section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act in that the large Hispanic population had 
been denied fair representation in local government.90 The DOJ 
requested a preliminary injunction under the Act to prevent 
the Village from holding its spring election for Board 
members.91 The injunction was granted.92 After a six-day bench 
trial, the court concluded that the Village’s current practice of 
electing Board members was in violation of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act because it diluted the Hispanic vote in 
accordance with Gingles.93 Each party was permitted to submit 
briefs thereafter, outlining prospective remedial plans for how 
to solve the lack of fair representation in the new elections.94  
  
 86 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. This practice is known as “bullet” or “single shot” voting. Id.  
 89 Id. at 419. All population percentages are as of the 2000 Census. Id.  
 90 Id. at 416. 
 91 Id. Cesar Ruiz intervened as a plaintiff in this action. Id. at 417. Ruiz had 
received nearly all the Hispanic votes in 2006 for a seat on the Board of Trustees, but 
still did not garner enough support to win a spot. Id. at 431. 
 92 Id. at 416. 
 93 Id. at 417, 453. The court determined this through its analysis of the 
preconditions and factors set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Id. at 420-47. 
 94 Id. at 417. FairVote also submitted an amicus brief in which it advocated 
for cumulative voting. Id. FairVote is an advocacy group for election reform that strives 
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The DOJ set forth a plan that would have established 
six districts within the Village, one for each Trustee on the 
Board.95 Once the districts were drawn, voters would cast their 
ballots for a single Board member from their district.96 All seats 
would be voted for simultaneously in the first new election, 
with staggered terms thereafter.97 The Village proposed an 
alternative plan: members of the six-person Board would still 
be elected through an at-large, multimember system, but the 
system would use cumulative voting to elect all six members of 
the Board concurrently.98 The DOJ opposed the plan, but the 
court adopted Port Chester’s proposed remedy, giving required 
deference to the jurisdiction and local legislature.99  
A. Understanding the Department of Justice’s Position on 
Cumulative Voting: The DOJ’s Rejection of the Port 
Chester Plan 
In its opposition brief to the Village’s proposed 
cumulative voting remedy, the DOJ cryptically noted that, 
while it objected to cumulative voting, “[t]his is not to say that 
cumulative voting would never be an appropriate remedy in a 
[section] 2 case.”100 Here, however, the DOJ rejected Port 
Chester’s proposal as an inappropriate remedy.101 In fact, the 
DOJ’s opposition to cumulative voting in Port Chester seems 
more vociferous than the DOJ’s opposition to cumulative voting 
in other cases; in the past, the DOJ seemed more ready to 
  
to “respect every vote and every voice through bold approaches to increase voter 
turnout, meaningful ballot choices and fair representation.” See Who We Are, 
FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/who-we-
are (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).  
 95 See Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 420, 447; Memorandum of Law of the 
United States of America in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan at 6, 
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-cv-15173).  
 96 See Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 447.  
 97 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21-22.  
 98 See Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief at 1, 17, Port Chester, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-cv-15173). 
 99 Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 
794-95 (1973); Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Once a violation 
of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a district court should give the 
appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to devise a remedial plan.”). 
 100 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20. 
 101 See id. 
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embrace the system.102 Regardless, the DOJ argued that Port 
Chester’s plan was deficient for several reasons.  
First, the DOJ noted that courts may not order 
multimember districts “absent insurmountable difficulties’ in 
using single member districts.”103 It argued that “cumulative 
voting [was] plainly not a viable alternative for Port Chester 
compared to the presumptive remedy of single-member 
districts”—especially because the Hispanic population was not 
so geographically dispersed.104 Next, addressing what 
FairVote—a voting advocacy group that submitted an amicus 
brief endorsing cumulative voting—perceived to be a 
prevalence of jurisdictions nationwide that have adopted 
cumulative voting as a remedy for section 2 violations, the DOJ 
noted summarily that the approximately sixty jurisdictions 
where cumulative voting had been implemented as a cure were 
mostly located in Texas and other areas in the South, and 
applied mostly to school boards.105 The significance of this 
geographic concentration was not detailed. The DOJ also 
argued that, upon appellate review, cumulative voting plans 
had been rejected wholesale by circuit courts.106 In each of these 
situations, it claimed, the courts had described cumulative 
voting as too “unconventional,” or as impermissibly preserving 
at-large systems.107 And while noting that the DOJ had never 
discussed cumulative voting as an “outright 
improper . . . remedy to a section 2 violation,” the DOJ 
  
 102 See, e.g., Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 9 
(discussing four cases where the DOJ, either as amicus or litigating party, indicated 
that cumulative voting could be a viable remedy option for section 2 violations). Steven 
J. Mulroy speculates that the heightened opposition to cumulative voting in this case 
might be related to the fact that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of 
New York, not the central DOJ in Washington, D.C., took the lead in the Port Chester 
case. Telephone Interview with Steven J. Mulroy, Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys Sch. 
of Law (Apr. 3, 2011). 
 103 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 16 (quoting Chapman v. 
Meier, 410 U.S. 1, 18 (1975)). 
 104 Id. at 20. 
 105 Id. at 17. For a current list of political subdivisions where cumulative 
voting is in effect, see Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting, 
supra note 65. 
 106 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 17-18. Here, the DOJ cited 
several cases for this proposition, including Dillard v. Baldwin County Commissioners, 
376 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593 (7th 
Cir. 2000), Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998), Cane v. Worcester County 
Commission, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994), and LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th 
Cir. 1993). Id. 
 107 Id. 
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contended that the Village and FairVote108 falsely characterized 
the DOJ’s positive stance on cumulative voting.109 For example, 
the Village and FairVote each noted that the DOJ had almost 
always allowed for new cumulative voting process changes 
under the section 5 preclearance procedure.110 The DOJ argued 
that the preclearance procedure is not the same as a remedy 
under section 2.111 
Finally, the DOJ expressed its concern with the 
practical application of cumulative voting in Port Chester. 
Specifically, the DOJ noted that, with the exponential growth 
of the Hispanic population in Port Chester, the “Hispanic 
community could come to dominate the political landscape in 
Port Chester even under the current at-large system.”112 The 
DOJ asserted that cumulative voting tends to produce “one, but 
only one, heavily supported minority candidate,” and “[i]n the 
context of a steadily increasing Hispanic population in Port 
Chester, cumulative voting could restrain the ability of 
Hispanics to elect more than one Hispanic-preferred Trustee.”113 
This argument, however, seems to be at odds with the DOJ’s 
vote-dilution claim. 
The court rejected the DOJ’s arguments, addressing some 
more directly than others. The court did not attack the DOJ’s 
assertion that single-member districts are highly presumptive 
remedies, nor did it address the relevance of the fact that 
cumulative voting has been used almost exclusively in the South. 
The court did, however, distinguish the facts of courts of appeals 
cases that the DOJ cited.114 In the instances where cumulative 
  
 108 FairVote submitted an amicus brief in support of alternative voting 
schemes, and advocated for Port Chester’s chosen scheme of cumulative voting as well 
as choice voting. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae, United States v. Vill. of Port 
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (06-civ-15173). 
 109 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20. 
 110 Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 8; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 108, at 15. 
 111 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21. For a more detailed 
discussion of the interplay between section 2 and section 5, see infra Part III.A. 
 112  Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21. 
 113 Id. 
 114 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (noting that in cases where a district court’s order of cumulative voting was stuck 
down, “the circuit courts found either that the district court improperly imposed its 
own remedy without first finding that defendant’s plan was not legally 
acceptable . . . or the district court’s plan did not adequately take into account the 
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voting was rejected, the district courts either did not defer to the 
political subdivision’s preferred remedies as required by law or 
impermissibly mandated a voting scheme on their own.115  
The court also found that, specific to the Village, the 
proposed remedy was legal under the Voting Rights Act and 
New York law, and would cleanse the section 2 violation.116 
Notably, it would not require Hispanics to see ultimate success 
in the election; it would simply “provide a genuine opportunity 
to exercise an electoral power that is commensurate with its 
population.”117 The court noted that an expert had applied the 
“threshold of exclusion”118 test to determine that Hispanic voters 
would enjoy an actual opportunity to elect their candidate of 
choice.119 Further, the court found that, in the specific context of 
the Village of Port Chester, the implementation of cumulative 
voting would not create a new section 2 violation so long as the 
implementation process included a robust educational program 
and staggered terms were eliminated.120 Finally, benefits of the 
plan were clear: it did not violate the “one-person, one vote” 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, and would not 
require racial districting.121 Because the Village’s Plan was 
legally and factually defensible, the court gave due deference to 
the Village’s legislative policy judgments.122 On December 22, 
2009, the parties signed a consent decree, which the court 
  
preferences of the defendant . . . [or] was deemed inappropriate in judicial elections for 
reasons unique to the judiciary”) (internal citations omitted). 
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 447-51. 
 117 Id. at 449 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 118 The court took into account the possibility that the white majority would 
not support the minority-preferred candidate at all. Id. at 450 (explaining that the 
threshold of exclusion takes the “worst case scenario” into account). The “threshold of 
exclusion” is “the percentage of the vote that will guarantee the winning of a seat even 
under the most unfavorable circumstances.” Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d 
932, 937 (D.S.D. 2007), aff’d 551 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc 604 F.3d 553 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 874 (M.D. Ala. 
1988)); see also Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A Remedial Road Map for the 
Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1867, 
1880 (1999) [hereinafter Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out] (explaining the threshold of 
exclusion is calculated by “1” divided by the numbers of seats available plus “1”).  
 119 Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
 120 Id. at 451-52. 
 121 Id. at 452-53. 
 122 Id. at 453; see also Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 
1994) (“Once a violation of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a 
district court should give the appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to 
devise a remedial plan.”). 
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entered, directing the Village to implement cumulative voting 
with a number of provisions.123  
Importantly, in a four-to-two vote of the Board, the 
Village determined that it would appeal the section 2 liability 
ruling of the district court.124 But for now, the cumulative voting 
scheme still stands.  
  
 123 See generally Consent Decree, Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-
Civ-15173). The decree “remain[s] in effect through June 22, 2016 or three election 
cycles, whichever is longer.” Id. ¶ 10. 
 124  See Kirk Semple, Port Chester to Appeal U.S. Voting-Rights Ruling Aimed at 
Helping Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/02/24/nyregion/24chester.html; see also United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 11-1831 (2d Cir. May 5, 2011). The 
Village has only indicated that a recent Supreme Court case lends support to the 
argument there was no impermissible vote dilution practice employed in Port Chester’s 
election process when the DOJ brought suit. See Port Chester Appeals Federal Voting 
Rights Ruling, CBS N.Y., Feb. 24, 2011, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/24/port-
chester-appeals-federal-voting-rights-ruling. Assumedly, the Village intends to base its 
appeal on Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). In its motion for 
reconsideration in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the 
Village argued several points that it considered grounds for reconsideration. Among 
them, the two upon which the Village will likely base its appeal are (1) the election of 
what the Village deems to be minority-preferred candidates, aside from those elected 
through cumulative voting in the June 2010 election, and (2) dicta in Bartlett v. 
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, which contemplated that if a crossover district were 
allowed to satisfy the first Gingles prong, the third Gingles prong would come under 
greater scrutiny. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider 
5-14, Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-Civ-15173). Port Chester will likely 
contend that Mayor Dennis Pilla, who was previously found to be a Hispanic-preferred 
candidate, has been elected as mayor twice since the court determined the Village’s 
section 2 liability. See id. at 5; see also Nathan Mayberg & Jananne Abel, Pilla Wins 
Re-election by a Landslide, PORT CHESTER WESTMORE NEWS, MAR. 18, 2011, 
http://pc.westmorenews.com/atf.php?sid=16216&current_edition= 
2011-03-18. This will naturally require the Village to proffer evidence in support of its 
theory. The Village will also likely contend that, in previous elections, crossover 
districts were a factor, and did, in fact, aid the Hispanic population in electing its 
candidate of choice. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Reconsider, supra, at 8-14. Because Bartlett dicta seemed to say that a district that 
used a crossover majority vote to prove an opportunity to elect would have difficulty 
proving the third Gingles precondition—that the white majority votes in a sufficient 
bloc to preclude the effectiveness of the minority vote—the Village will likely argue 
that such was the case in Port Chester, and that, therefore, the DOJ should not have 
been able to make out a prima facie case of vote dilution. In opposition to Port 
Chester’s motion for reconsideration, the DOJ argued that it had not based its 
enforcement action on a crossover district theory at all. See Memorandum of Law of the 
United States of America in Opposition to Port Chester’s Motion to Reconsider 11, Port 
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-Civ-15173). Rather, the DOJ had shown that 
Hispanic voters in Port Chester comprised more than fifty percent CVAP in the 
relevant district—what was ultimately required by Bartlett—and had shown that the 
Hispanic vote was, in fact, diluted. Id. at 11-12. The DOJ’s motion to dismiss the 
appeal is pending as this note goes to press. See Motion of the United States to Dismiss 
the Appeal, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 11-1831 (2d Cir. June7, 2011). 
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B. Cumulative Voting Carries the Election Day in Port 
Chester 
In June 2010, the Village of Port Chester was once 
again able to hold elections for the Board of Trustees—but this 
time, it had a new system to use.125 It was the first time that 
cumulative voting would be used in the state of New York.126 In 
addition to Election Day, the polls were open for five days of 
early voting.127 Many voted as often as they were allowed, with 
individuals casting up to six votes for one candidate, or 
distributing their votes as they pleased.128 An exit poll showed 
that “[t]urnout was at least 10% higher than in recent Port 
Chester municipal elections.”129 
The consent decree set forth a number of provisions that 
were to be followed in accordance with the implementation of 
the cumulative voting system. The “Voter Education Program” 
of the decree mandated that the Village implement a number of 
new educational elements.130 First, a Program Coordinator, 
fluent in both English and Spanish, would be hired and trained 
to assist the Village in carrying out the decree.131 The consent 
decree required the Village to hold a total of twelve general 
public forums—six each in both English in Spanish—prior to 
the June 2010 election.132 The forums would provide practice 
rounds of voting and training, and would be advertised in local 
newspapers and on local radio and television stations.133 After 
the initial election, bilingual forums are required each year 
  
 125 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 126 Jim Fitzgerald, Port Chester Election: New York Villagers Get Six Votes Each, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/15/port-
chester-election-new_n_612365.html. Accordingly, Judge Robinson embarked on an analysis in 
his opinion that demonstrated the legality of the system with respect to the New York 
Constitution. Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49. 
 127 Fitzgerald, supra note 126; see also Early Voting Information, PORT 
CHESTER VOTES, http://portchestervotes.org/earlyvoting (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
 128 Fitzgerald, supra note 126. 
 129  DAVID C. KIMBALL & MARTHA KROPF, CUMULATIVE VOTING EDUCATIONAL 
PROGRAM EXIT POLL REPORT, PORT CHESTER, N.Y. ii (Aug. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/PCFinalReportAug20.pdf. 
 130 Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶ 6. 
 131 Id. app. ¶ 1. “Defendants shall assign one employee to act as Program 
Coordinator . . . to assist in carrying out the Defendants’ obligations under this Decree. 
The Coordinator shall be able to understand, speak, write, and read fluently both 
English and Spanish.” Id. 
 132 Id. app. ¶¶ 5-6. Among other things, each forum was required to allow the 
public to practice cumulative voting. Id. 
 133 Id.  
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until 2016.134 The Village sent voters detailed bilingual sample 
ballots and instructions before the election, and letters regarding 
the new system were also requested to be sent home with public 
school students.135 In addition, a number of civic posts, like 
libraries, would carry bilingual samples and brochures for voter 
information.136 Finally, for the benefit of voters, public forums 
educated the community about the candidate-qualifying 
process.137 Voters mobilized with t-shirts, signs, and tote bags 
that read, “Your voice, your vote, your village.”138 
Importantly, the consent decree included a number of 
provisions regarding Spanish language assistance. The decree 
stressed the necessity of the Village to comply with section 203 
of the Voting Rights Act to ensure that both English and 
Spanish language election information and materials were 
equally available.139 Translators and bilingual election 
personnel were to be hired and present at all election-related 
events conducted in Port Chester.140 The number of Spanish-
speaking poll officials was to be commensurate with the 
Hispanic population surrounding each polling place.141 Poll 
officials would also receive more training about the 
requirements of section 203.142 The Voting Education Plan 
Coordinator would keep a log of all of these events, and would 
send the log to the DOJ to show the Village’s compliance; the 
Village would also prepare a postelection report including exit 
  
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. app. ¶¶ 7-8.  
 136 Id. app. ¶ 13. Additionally, the decree required “Defendant . . . [to] make 
bilingual persons who are knowledgeable about the cumulative voting process available 
to meet with different Hispanic organizations to meet with such organizations and 
explain the cumulative voting process,” id. app. ¶ 12, as well as “post a bilingual 
sample ballot with detailed instructions concerning the cumulative voting process in 
libraries, public assistance agencies, village offices, senior centers, civic centers and 
other public places . . . .” Id. app. ¶ 13. 
 137 Id. app. ¶ 16. 
 138 Fitzgerald, supra note 126. 
 139 Consent Decree, supra note 123, app. ¶ 18. Section 203, In relevant part, 
requires that “Whenever [a district] . . . provides any registration or voting notices, 
forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the 
electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the 
applicable minority group as well as in the English language.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c) 
(2006). Although, as one scholar notes, “[T]he salad days for [section] 203 and the other 
minority language provisions may be coming to an end.” Michael J. Pitts, The Voting 
Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 965 (2008). While section 
203 is existing law, it was perhaps reiterated in the consent decree to ensure its 
application regardless of the section’s actual status. 
 140 Consent Decree, supra note 123, app. ¶¶ 19, 22. 
 141 Id. app. ¶ 24. 
 142 Id. app. ¶ 26(b). 
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polling for the United States after each election.143 The decree 
expires in 2016 (or, the equivalent of three election cycles); up 
until that time, the Village is also subject to the preclearance 
requirements of section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act,144 and 
must notify the Attorney General of any changes in its voting 
practices and receive permission from the Attorney General 
before implementing those changes.145 
1. Praise for the New System 
On June 15, 2010, the Village’s voters elected the first 
Hispanic member to the Board.146 Mr. Luis Marino, the newly 
elected Board member, said that he felt the new system 
benefited him.147 The Mayor of Port Chester, Dennis G. Pilla, 
spoke positively of the system, boasting “the results are clear—
that the new system worked.”148 In fact, the system worked not 
only to elect the Hispanic-preferred candidate, but it also 
created a diverse Board: the villagers elected two democrats, 
two republicans, one independent, and one conservative.149 It 
was also the first time an African-American was elected to the 
Board.150 The Board now comprises a mix of newcomers, like 
Marino, and those who have played a part in Port Chester 
politics for years: the villagers elected a former mayor to sit on 
the Board, as well.151 
One of the reasons why the system “worked” was the 
education program for which the DOJ advocated in the consent 
decree. The exit poll report from the first Port Chester 
cumulative voting election shows that “the vast majority of Port 
Chester voters showed that they took full advantage of 
cumulative voting.”152 In fact, “[m]ore than 95% of voters in all 
  
 143 Id. app. ¶¶ 30-31. 
 144  42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). 
 145 Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶¶ 9, 11. 
 146 KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 129, at 39; Semple, First Latino Board 
Member, supra note 1. 
 147 Semple, First Latino Board Member, supra note 1. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 John Branca, elected to the board in June 2010, was a “trustee from 1983-93 
and mayor from 1993-95.” Jananne Abel, Thirteen trustee candidates to choose from on 
June 15, PORT CHESTER WESTMORE NEWS, June 11, 2010, http://pc.westmorenews.com/ 
atf.php?sid=13375&current_edition=2010-06-; Board of Trustees, VILL. OF PORT CHESTER, 
N.Y., http://www.portchesterny.com/Pages/PortChesterNY_BTrust/index (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2011). 
 152 KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 129, at 39. 
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demographic groups reported that they used all six of their votes 
in the election, which comports with the number of votes cast in 
the official election results. In addition, voters demonstrated 
that they knew how to plump their votes.”153 Importantly, “Latino 
voters, African American voters, voters whose first language was 
Spanish, and voters who did not finish high school were more 
likely to give all of their votes to one candidate. These are the 
same demographic groups who reported being more familiar with 
cumulative voting.”154 Polled voters spoke highly of the educational 
offerings, handouts, and community presentations, which 
accounted in large part for their understanding of the new 
system.155 The television and radio advertisements also 
contributed to their notice and edification.156  
This result is not an uncommon one with the 
implementation of cumulative voting: “The track record of the 
first cumulative voting elections held (pursuant to settlements) 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s is . . . impressive . . . from the 
standpoint of racial and ethnic minority empowerment.”157 In 
fact, “[w]henever racial or ethnic minority candidates ran, 
cumulative voting resulted in the election of racial or ethnic 
minority candidates for the first time in decades (or ever).”158 
For his part, Mayor Pilla is pleased with the new 
system.159 He notes that the Village was extremely proactive in 
ensuring that the Voter Education Program was implemented 
in the most effective way possible.160 And because the system 
was so new, elements that might have seemed simple initially 
underwent careful scrutiny: the ballot design, for example, 
required several draft iterations and the vetting of different 
Spanish dialects.161 Two of the most effective tools for voters, 
according to the mayor, were the sample ballot and a cumulative 
voting “How-To” guide, which were also two of the least 
expensive measures the Village employed.162 Mayor Pilla also 
  
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at iv-v, 16. 
 156 Id. at 16. 
 157 See Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out, supra note 118, at 1891. 
 158 See id. at 1891-92 (discussing the effectiveness of settlement agreement 
implementation of limited, cumulative, and preference voting in different political 
subdivisions across the county). 
 159 Interview with Dennis Pilla, Mayor, Vill. of Port Chester, in Port Chester, 
N.Y. (Mar. 27, 2011). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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explains that the Village’s civic educational component was 
crucial—it conveyed to citizens why voting in local government 
is so significant.163 As Mayor Pilla notes, “It really affects your 
day-to-day life more than other forms of government.”164 
Mayor Pilla, who is against the appeal, believes that 
cumulative voting is a progressive step for the Village, and that, 
if the new system unraveled, it would be a step backwards.165 
And with the practical knowledge gained from the first election, 
he thinks that the system will only become more streamlined so 
that the Village’s costs can kept as low as possible.166 He also 
accredits the higher voter turnout rate during the June 2010 
election in part to “early voting.”167 While early voting within the 
Village required more security and staff, it was an effective tool, 
and one he believes could be implemented elsewhere to boost 
voter turnout.168 Going forward, Mayor Pilla also believes that 
cumulative voting with staggered terms should be an option for 
the Village, provided that the number of seats up for election at 
any given time allows for the Hispanic population to surpass the 
threshold of exclusion.169 
Professor Steven J. Mulroy is also a proponent of 
cumulative voting within the Village—in fact, he consulted 
with the Village as it formed its remedial plan.170 Mulroy notes 
that the community embodies qualities that are most fitting for 
a political subdivision that establishes cumulative voting: the 
Hispanic population, while compact in one area, was relatively 
dispersed throughout the Village; and the Village’s size, 
geographically, is too small to make districting practicable.171  
2. Media Backlash 
One problem with the DOJ’s refusal to openly sanction the 
cumulative voting system—which was evidenced after the Port 
Chester case—is the backlash and criticism that resulted within 
the public. Implementation of the Port Chester plan was not 
  
 163  Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167  Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Telephone Interview with Steven J. Mulroy, Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys 
Sch. of Law (Apr. 3, 2011). 
 171  Id. 
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without critics. One major complaint of commentators was the fact 
that the DOJ had not supported the remedy. As one individual 
noted, “Judge Robinson . . . overstepped his bounds to impose a 
solution that not even Barack Obama’s Justice Department 
wanted. . . . [Judge Robinson] should be impeached.”172 
Activists who oppose illegal immigration also condemned 
the move, noting that the court that implemented the plan 
discussed the fact that “there were many more Hispanics who 
were not voters” living in the Village, and they asserted that 
these individuals were considered in the ultimate decision.173 
William Gheen, president of Americans for Legal Immigration 
PAC, likened the scheme to racial gerrymandering: 
It works only when a minority votes in a racist fashion . . . instead of 
choosing candidates on their qualifications. Imagine [a federal 
program that turns] 12 million illegal aliens into voters. . . . Envision 
a future of when that happens. A lot of people aren’t really thinking 
about [when the U.S. would] suddenly have a new voting bloc of 12 
million illegal aliens.174  
Additionally, the New York Post published a scathing 
editorial, which stated that Port Chester “was forced to 
swallow a goofy voting scheme that makes sense only if the aim 
is to erase the distinction between legal and illegal 
immigrants.”175 It went on to note that the remedy was made 
possible even though “many of the Latinos are here illegally, so 
they can’t vote. No matter. The cockeyed voting system was put 
in place to satisfy a claim of discrimination based on their total 
numbers, as though immigration status has no consequence to 
election results.”176 
These critics should be disabused of false notions. First, 
any section 2 remedial scheme aims to give the minority 
population a real opportunity to elect a preferred candidate—
not a minority candidate. “Racial” voting, however, is a 
reasonable concern. But this concern can be countered. For 
instance, recognizing that the new system will change the 
  
 172 Erick Erickson, Add Federal Judge Stephen Robinson to the “Must 
Impeach” List, REDSTATE (June 16, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://www.redstate.com/erick/ 
2010/06/16/add-federal-judge-stephen-robinson-to-the-must-impeach-list. 
 173 Bob Unruh, 1-Man, 6-Vote Racial Plan Used to Choose Board’s 1st Minority, 
WORLDNETDAILY (Aug. 8, 2010, 10:18 PM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageID=188173. 
 174 Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175 Michael Goodwin, Dave: To Bankruptcy—& Beyond!, N.Y. POST, June 20, 2010, 
available at http://pagesixsixsix.com/f/print/news/local/dave_to_bankruptcy_beyond_ 
mFBhlVG1XBJj1DNCzBHWBJ. 
 176 Id. 
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status quo—which has been deemed to constitute racial bloc 
voting already—is meant to ameliorate racial voting, not breed 
it.177 Further, as Mulroy notes in describing the “self-
district[ing]” principles of alternative systems, 
“[v]oters . . . have complete freedom to identify what interests 
and issues are most germane to them, and vote accordingly for 
any candidate(s) (of any race), anywhere in the jurisdiction, 
perceived to represent those concerns.”178  
Second, the claim about illegal aliens’ controlling the 
vote is without merit here. In Port Chester, the court did 
discuss the total population (both citizens and noncitizens), the 
voting age population (VAP), and the citizen voting age 
population (CVAP) of Hispanics in its liability analysis, but 
placed an emphasis on CVAP in finding that the minority-
majority district of Hispanics was sufficiently large and 
geographically compact enough to show a real opportunity to 
elect.179 However, Gheen’s is an argument that has been used in 
other cases. Because “[t]he Constitution requires inclusion of 
all inhabitants in the apportionment base for congressional 
districts but does not specify procedures for drawing local 
districts or deciding who must be included,” decisions about 
whether to draw lines according to total population, VAP, or 
CVAP has been the focal point of contention in recent years.180 
But the first prong of Gingles, which includes the benchmark 
districts that are drawn during the liability phase of a section 2 
claim, have usually been interpreted by the courts as 
embracing CVAP.181 The Port Chester district that was used as 
a benchmark conforms to this standard. 
Regarding the implementation of the system, the Post 
noted that “[t]axpayers were robbed, with the town spending 
$300,000 on the process and maybe $1 million in legal fees—all 
for an election in which 3,000 people voted. The turnout was 
  
 177 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 352-53. 
 178 Id. at 354. 
 179 See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421-23 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 180 Carl E. Goldfarb, Note, Allocating the Local Apportionment Pie: What Portion 
for Resident Aliens?, 104 YALE L.J. 1441, 1456 (1995); Persily, supra note 53, at 778. For 
other districting purposes, Goldfarb argued that “excluding noncitizens from the 
apportionment base would impose greater hardships on a community,” in that the 
district’s resources would likely be more swiftly depleted. Goldfarb, supra, at 1455. Many 
critics of districting that relies on total population or VAP of a minority group also neglect 
to recognize that legal aliens, who cannot vote, “partake of life in the community just as 
much as citizens, paying all taxes and drawing on all community services.” Id. at 1456. 
 181 See text supra note 53. 
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about twenty-five percent of registered voters, the same as in 
previous elections. But cheer up: A Latino candidate won.”182 
Even some of the Village’s voters expressed unease: 
“That was very strange. . . . I’m not sure I liked it. All my life, 
I’ve heard, ‘one man, one vote,’” said Arthur Furano, a Village 
resident.183 This sort of reaction is not at all unique with the 
implementation of alternative voting practices. In an empirical 
study of communities in which cumulative voting was 
implemented, Richard H. Pildes and Kristen A. Donoghue 
found that cumulative voting was disliked for just this 
reason—the “widely shared view that cumulative voting was 
undemocratic and unconstitutional because it violated the one 
person, one vote principle.”184 But the claim attacking the 
constitutionality of the cumulative voting system on “one 
person, one vote” grounds is without merit.185 In another 
community where cumulative voting was implemented in 1988, 
one individual recalled, 
When the idea was first proposed, as far as the public reaction, we 
thought it was a joke, because the idea that one person could vote 
seven times in one particular race was just really unheard of at that 
time, and many people thought it was just something they were 
grasping at straws kind of a thing, and it would not ever come into 
effect here. Once it became the law under the settlement of this court 
case, a lot of people still didn’t believe it.186 
Joseph Kenner, a Village Trustee who voted to appeal 
the Port Chester Court’s vote-dilution ruling, describes the new 
system as “a little unusual.”187 Kenner would like to see the 
district court’s decision overturned.188 He would also like to see 
  
 182 Goodwin, supra note 175. 
 183 See Fitzgerald, supra note 126. 
 184  Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 282. 
 185 Id. While perhaps understandable because of the unusualness of the 
cumulative voting system, these sentiments are not properly placed. 
The principle of one person, one vote now viewed as so ‘fundamental’ to 
democratic government was not, of course, constitutionally established until 
1964. Moreover, cumulative voting does not violate the principle of one person, 
one vote; as long as each person has equal voting power, the formal number of 
votes cast is irrelevant to the equal-protection concerns embodied in the one 
person, one vote doctrine. 
Id.  
 186 Id. at 270 (quoting Sue Smith, a Republican voted onto the Board of 
Education in Chilton County under a cumulative voting electoral process).  
 187  Telephone Interview with Joseph Kenner, Vill. of Port Chester Tr. (Mar. 
28, 2011). 
 188 Id. 
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a return to the old system that Port Chester had in place—an 
at-large, multimember voting scheme; he asserts that 
candidates should be expected to garner as many votes as 
possible in more traditional ways, like going door-to-door, 
building natural coalitions with voters, and holding candidate 
forums.189 The new scheme, he says, was also very costly.190 He 
notes that one current issue with the Village residents’ 
reception of the system could be that the villagers associate the 
voting scheme aspect with the section 2 lawsuit liability aspect, 
which he believes carries a “stigma.”191 Kenner explains that 
voters have certainly expressed tremendous outrage over the 
court’s order, which directed Port Chester to change its voting 
system.192 The outrage also stems from the fact that this 
unusual system was implemented to achieve a desired 
outcome—one that, in this case, is based on race.193 
But Kenner also asserts that, of the options available at 
the remedy phase in the district court, cumulative voting was 
truly the best for the Village.194 Due to the small geographic 
area, the relative geographic dispersion of Hispanics within the 
Village, and a districting system’s potential to “crack” other 
cohesive groups, Kenner believes that a districting system 
would be impractical.195 One of Kenner’s main concerns with the 
new system is the elimination of staggered terms, which was 
ordered by the court as necessary in order for the Hispanic 
population to meet the threshold of exclusion. Voting for all six 
Board seats concurrently means that, during any given 
election, all seats can be replaced with a set of newcomers, 
eviscerating institutional knowledge.196 Kenner also noted that 
it is too soon to tell whether the Board’s partisan diversity will 
work to hamstring any Village initiatives; but no group on the 
Board holds an absolute majority.197 
With this kind of misunderstanding and general unease, 
it is necessary for the DOJ to proffer its position regarding 
alternative voting systems. 
  
 189 Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
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III. IS CUMULATIVE VOTING A VIABLE REMEDIAL SCHEME 
FOR SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS? 
As mentioned, the DOJ has never actively sought 
cumulative voting as a remedy for a section 2 violation. But the 
DOJ’s arguments in the Port Chester case can be extrapolated 
to glean a wider perspective of the DOJ’s position. The DOJ 
required an in-depth educational program in the Village 
because cumulative voting is complex and has broad strategic 
implications. The DOJ may require other conditions to ensure 
that cumulative voting comports with the mandates of section 2 
and the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 provides some indication.  
A. The Interplay Between Sections 2 and 5: What the DOJ 
Might Seek Under a Cumulative Voting System 
In its opposition to Port Chester’s proposed remedy of 
cumulative voting, the DOJ admonished FairVote, amicus for 
the Village’s proposed remedy, for drawing parallels between 
the DOJ’s section 5 and section 2 positions.198 Steven J. Mulroy 
has likewise drawn comparisons between the two Voting 
Rights Act sections, looking to section 5 preclearance objections 
in an effort to glean what kinds of remedial schemes might be 
appropriate under section 2.199 Section 5 provides that certain 
jurisdictions that are “covered” must obtain federal approval—
i.e., preclearance—from the Attorney General before changing 
any of their voting procedures.200 Covered jurisdictions are those 
with particularly discriminatory voting histories.201 To be 
precleared by the Attorney General, a “covered jurisdiction[] 
must demonstrate that electoral changes are discriminatory 
neither in purpose nor in effect, a standard the Supreme Court 
interpreted to require a showing that the changes do not 
worsen, or cause retrogression to, existing opportunities for 
political participation by minority voters.”202 The covered 
  
 198 Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20 (“FairVote also 
improperly conflates election schemes that the Department has not objected to in the 
preclearance process versus remedies that it has endorsed.”). 
 199 See, e.g., Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14. 
 200 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism 
and the Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 857, 868 (2011) 
[hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism]. 
 201 Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism, supra note 200, at 868. 
 202 Ellen Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political 
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT: REAUTHORIZATION 
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jurisdiction must submit any proposed voting-system change to 
the Attorney General, who “may interpose an objection by 
informing the jurisdiction of the decision no later than 60 days 
after a voting change has been submitted.”203 
There is undoubtedly interplay between section 5 and 
section 2. Interestingly, it was a section 5 case—Allen v. State 
Board of Elections—that first allowed vote dilution challenges 
under the Voting Rights Act.204 In that case, the Supreme Court 
noted that certain registration processes might not just deny 
access to the ballot, but might also dilute minority votes.205 
Witnesses before Congress have also testified that “‘[s]ection 2 
would be inadequate without [s]ection 5 to enforce it.’”206 Indeed, 
“[s]ection 5 operates to protect the gains that plaintiffs obtain 
through section 2 litigation.”207 Port Chester, for example, is 
subject to preclearance requirements now that the litigation is 
over.208 And if an agreed upon remedial plan is not implemented 
correctly, section 5 ensures that the plan will work going 
forward.209 Also similar to section 5, section 2 lets states choose 
their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act.210 
Because of the similarities between sections 2 and 5, an 
examination of the DOJ’s administrative preclearance 
determinations might therefore reveal the DOJ’s position on 
  
OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 183, 190 (Ana 
Henderson ed., 2007).  
 203 See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 19. 
 204 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (“The right to 
vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition 
on casting a ballot.”). 
 205 Id.  
 206 Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting 
Rights Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate? 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 385, 416 (2008) (citing Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 146 (2006) [hereinafter Section 5 Hearing] (statement of Anita Earls, 
Director, Advocacy, University of North Carolina School of Law)). 
 207 Id. (quoting Section 5 Hearing, supra note 206, at 145 (statement of Anita 
Earls, Director, Advocacy, University of North Carolina School of Law)). 
 208 Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶¶ 9, 11. Port Chester is subject to prior 
clearance under section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act, which is largely identical to 
section 5. Id; compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006) (section 3(a)), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(c) (2006) (section 5). 
 209 Clarke, supra note 206, at 416 (citing Voting Rights Act: An Examination of the 
Scope and Criteria for Coverage Under the Special Provisions of the Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34 (2005) 
(statement of Jose Garza, Counsel for the League of United Latin American Citizens)). 
 210 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) (“Section 5 gives States the 
flexibility to choose one theory of effective representation over the other.”). 
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alternative voting systems, like cumulative voting.211 
Evaluating the only cumulative voting preclearance objection 
from the Attorney General that existed in 1995, Steven J. 
Mulroy found that a DOJ investigation revealed no serious 
effort in the community to “solicit the views of the minority 
community, to investigate whether the minority community 
had a complete understanding of the cumulative voting system, 
or to provide bilingual education to the minority community 
regarding the new system.”212 Another objection rejected 
cumulative voting because the system would use “numbered 
posts,”213 which can also have a dilutive effect.214 Since then, 
another letter of objection from the Attorney General shows 
that a district wished to change from its single-member 
districting scheme to cumulative voting with staggered terms.215 
In its analysis, the DOJ noted that the district’s Hispanic 
population, which had been successful under the seven single-
member districting scheme to elect school board officials, would 
be unlikely to meet the threshold of exclusion.216 
These objections are telling in that they evince what the 
DOJ requires when implementing a cumulative voting system: 
namely, that the minority population can, in fact, meet the 
threshold of exclusion, and that the plan for education about 
the system prior to implementation is comprehensive.  
But there are notable distinctions between section 2 and 
section 5, which likely explain why the DOJ admonishes 
comparison of its positions regarding one or the other section. 
Section 2 concerns the opportunity of a minority group to elect 
its preferred representative, while section 5 merely asks 
whether a change has the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote. Furthermore, “[s]cholars and Supreme Court 
[J]ustices have begun to observe ‘discord and inconsistency’ 
  
 211 See Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14. 
 212 Id. Based on these factors, the Attorney General objected to a change in 
voting scheme in Cochran County, Texas, from its five-member city council elected 
under a traditional at-large system by plurality vote to cumulative voting on 
September 12, 1994. Id. 
 213 See Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 8. 
“Numbered Posts” are “[p]ositions on a city council or school board, somewhat similar 
to designated areas, where candidates run from a particular ‘post’ but still have to be 
elected at-large. Some numbered posts require that the candidate be a resident of a 
particular geographical area.” Glossary, supra note 10. 
 214 See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 215 Letter from Assistant Att’y Gen. to Haskell Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Sept. 
24, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_092401.pdf.  
 216 Id. 
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between the antidilution goal of [s]ection 2 and the 
antiretrogression goal of [s]ection 5.”217 Also, section 2 is 
permanent, while section 5 will sunset in 2031.218 Therefore, to 
the extent that section 5 positions can elucidate the DOJ’s 
stance regarding section 2, they reveal little more than does 
the Port Chester consent decree: the DOJ requires community 
education because of the strategic nature of cumulative voting 
and the potential for community confusion, and the threshold 
of exclusion must be met generously.  
The DOJ’s strong preference for single-member districts 
still stands in the way of full support for cumulative voting. 
But, after Bartlett, the preference for single-member districts 
should again be questioned.  
B. The Presumption of Single-Member Districts: Why the 
DOJ Advocates for Them, Why They Should Again Be 
Questioned, and Whether They Are Legally Replaceable 
As discussed, in Voting Rights Act cases like Port 
Chester, the DOJ typically argues that there is a heavy 
presumption in favor of single-member districts to remedy 
section 2 violations. The Port Chester Court, however, did not 
address this proposition in its opinion. This is likely because 
the court did not have to reach the question—the Village’s 
proposed remedy was factually and legally defensible according 
to the court, and so it paid due deference to the legislature.219 As 
we have seen, single-member districts have in fact been the 
preferred benchmark for measuring Voting Rights Act 
violations and for remedying impermissible vote dilution.220 But, 
for reasons explained below—especially in light of Bartlett—
presumptions of single-member districts must once again be 
questioned, and the DOJ must evaluate whether other systems 
might serve as permissible and more beneficial remedies.  
  
 217 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There is a 
fundamental flaw . . . in any scheme in which the Department of Justice is permitted or 
directed to encourage or ratify a course of unconstitutional conduct in order to find 
compliance with a statutory directive.”). Here, Justice Kennedy recognizes the tension 
between race-motivated districting and the prevalent use of this kind of line drawing to 
stave off vote dilution; see also Absoch et al., supra note 49, at 107. 
 218 See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 19. 
 219 See, e.g., Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Once a 
violation of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a district court should 
give the appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to devise a remedial plan.”). 
 220 See supra Part I.B. 
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1. Critiques of Single-Member Districts as the 
Traditional Cure 
Single-member districts are typically implemented as a 
cure for at-large, “winner-take-all” election practices.221 
However, the favoring of single-member districts can be 
criticized for a number of reasons. First, as the Supreme Court 
noted in Gingles, the multimember, at-large form was not 
“responsible for minority voters’ inability to elect its 
candidates”; rather, it was the winner-take-all practice in place 
within the at-large district that diluted the minority vote.222 
Thus, in thinking about the methodology of the electoral 
process in an at-large system, as opposed to the at-large system 
itself, cumulative voting could be an effective remedy. A 
cumulative voting system that retains a multimember district, 
but changes the method by which governmental seats are 
elected, is just as preferable as single-member districts, 
provided that the scheme affords the minority the potential to 
elect representatives articulated in Gingles.223 Theoretically, 
this kind of representation can be achieved whenever the 
threshold of exclusion is exceeded. The rule that at-large 
systems should be changed completely because the winner-
take-all nature diluted votes previously should not apply to 
cumulative voting, because cumulative voting is specifically 
“designed to enhance minority political opportunity.”224 While 
alternative voting schemes like cumulative voting are still at-
large, they are not winner-take-all. And while the Gingles 
Court attacked a multimember system, multimember systems 
are not necessarily invidious.225 Single-member districts were 
not even prevalent until 1842, when Congress decided that the 
House of Representatives should be elected from single-
  
 221 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 338, 362 (“An oft-repeated 
principle in voting rights cases is that single-member districts are ‘strongly preferred’ 
to at-large plans for court-ordered . . . remedies.”). 
 222 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 & n.17 (1986); see also Karlan, 
supra note 63, at 235-36. 
 223 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17; see also Karlan, supra note 63, at 235.  
 224 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 362-63 (discussing the fact 
that multimember district criticism stems from their “winner-take-all” nature).  
 225 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]here 
is no principle inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of the 
Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single-member districts the ‘proper’ 
mechanism for electing representatives to governmental bodies or for giving ‘undiluted’ 
effect to the votes of a numerical minority.”). 
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member districts.226 While multimember districts are attacked 
under section 2, they are still part and parcel with the 
American system of government.227 
Second, as mentioned, single-member districts that 
create geographic compactness of minorities became 
ultrasensitive to constitutional attack under the Equal 
Protection Clause.228 In Port Chester, the Village identified the 
Shaw line of cases as a potential concern.229 The Shaw cases 
make the remedy of cumulative voting seem attractive as a 
remedial measure because cumulative voting does not require 
district drawing on the basis of race, thus avoiding the risk of 
an equal-protection violation. The Port Chester Court noted 
favorably, too, that a cumulative voting plan would obviate 
concerns of racial gerrymandering.230 Especially now that 
Bartlett has foreclosed the possibility of remedying voter 
dilution with coalitional or crossover districts, courts should 
again consider cumulative voting and other alternative voting 
systems as replacements for single-member districts to 
eradicate the risks of racial gerrymandering. But there may be 
other factors that give a kind of “presumptive rightness” to 
single-member districts that other alternative systems do not 
enjoy—like the question of the liability-remedy relationship. 
2. The Test for Liability and Its Relation to Remedy: 
Are Single-Member Districts Legally Replaceable? 
Single-member districts have carried a heavy 
presumption in section 2 cases likely because of Gingles. 
Although the first Gingles precondition truly speaks to the 
dilution problem and potential violation, it also contemplates a 
remedy.231 The first Gingles factor forces the plaintiff to show 
that the grievance can be remedied by demonstrating that 
there is a problem with the current voting scheme, and that the 
  
 226 Id. at 898. 
 227 Id. 
 228 See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 241 (“Supreme Court 
decisions . . . cast substantial . . . doubt on the continued constitutionality of race-
conscious districting.”).  
 229 Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 10. 
 230 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453 
(“[C]umulative voting and alternative voting schemes have received focus precisely 
because they avoid the Shaw problem that plagued drawing single-member districts.” 
(citing Jason Kirksey, et al., Shaw v. Reno and the New Election Systems: The 
Cumulative Voting Alternative, VOTING RIGHTS REV. 10 (1995))). 
 231 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
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scheme can be rectified with another scheme—hence, that 
dilution exists.232 Indeed, the first Gingles precondition calls on 
the plaintiff to establish that there is an injury and to show 
that his injury can be redressed.233 This precondition requires 
demonstrating that a dilutive plan—like an at-large winner-
take-all system—injures the section 2 plaintiffs by failing to 
draw an available remedial district that would give those 
plaintiffs a chance to elect their chosen candidate. 
Accordingly, the political subdivision at issue must have 
a minority group that is “sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”234 
Therefore, to show injury, the section 2 plaintiff must come 
forward with a proposed plan that shows the minority group 
can constitute a majority in a single-member district. In 
Bartlett, the Supreme Court finally determined what this 
majority constituted for the sake of the geographical 
“compactness” requirement: the minority population must be 
fifty percent or more of VAP or CVAP in a given district.235  
Drawing these types of districts as a remedy to pass the 
first Gingles precondition is necessary, and courts have 
struggled with establishing a reasonable alternative practice as 
a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting 
practice.236 These decisions, however, ultimately concluded that 
the district system is the benchmark.237 Even in Port Chester, 
the expert who aided the DOJ in assessing the districts noted 
that “showing that Hispanics represent a majority of CVAP in 
a single member district is a typical method for arguing that 
there is an ability to elect [the minority’s candidate of 
choice].”238 Each of the hypothetical districts used by the DOJ in 
Port Chester did just that. In one plan, the total CVAP of 
Hispanics in one district was 50.51 percent; in the other, the 
  
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 50-51 & n.17 (1986). 
 234 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
 235 Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009) (noting that section 2 
requires first, the creation of a “majority-minority” district, in which a minority group 
composes a numerical of fifty percent or more of the voting-age population, and second, 
that a court is not required to draw crossover districts according to section 2). 
 236 See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994). 
 237 See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1247 (“To the extent there is any doubt whether 
[section] 2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we resolve that doubt by avoiding 
serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 238 United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425 & n.10 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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total CVAP of Hispanics was 56.27 percent in the opportunity-
to-elect district.239  
Therefore, in Port Chester, while the remedy was 
cumulative voting, a cumulative voting system was not used 
during the liability phase to show that the minority group had 
a potential to elect. It seems counterintuitive that the remedy 
used to show that a political subdivision has violated section 
2—the same remedy that shows that a non-dilutive scheme is 
possible—would not be implemented to cure the violation after 
liability was determined.  
a. The Unlikelihood That the Gingles Benchmark Will 
Change 
It seems unlikely that the first Gingles precondition will 
be reconstructed to allow for new benchmarks. In Voinovich v. 
Quilter, the Supreme Court noted that, to allow “atypical” claims 
under section 2, like crossover district claims, the first Gingles 
requirement “would have to be modified or eliminated,” 
presumably because the “compactness” requirement would not be 
at issue.240 The Court recently recognized this dilemma in Bartlett 
v. Strickland, where it refused to allow crossover districts to 
constitute a benchmark for the first Gingles precondition.241  
Those in favor of cumulative voting have suggested that, 
if cumulative voting was the remedy of choice, another test 
should supplant the typical benchmark of drawing single-
member districts for elections: the “threshold of exclusion” test. 
For example, Steven J. Mulroy has argued that a narrow view 
of the first Gingles prong, limiting the benchmark to single-
member districts, is unjustified.242 His argument turns on the 
language of the first Gingles precondition, which requires that 
the minority group has the “potential to elect representatives” 
  
 239 Id. at 425. In Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231, the Supreme Court ruled 
definitively that in order to meet the first Gingles precondition, the proposed district 
must comprise more than fifty percent VAP (or CVAP) of the district’s population. 
While Port Chester was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett, the 
majority-minority district proposed by the DOJ—and used to determined liability—
pass muster under Bartlett.  
 240 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993) (noting the first Gingles 
requirement “would have to be modified or eliminated” to allow crossover-district claims).  
 241 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1237.  
 242 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 369. Mulroy asserts that, when 
the Supreme Court devised the first Gingles precondition, it was not contemplating an 
alternative voting system, which is why the compactness requirement centers around 
single-member districts. But he argues this should not foreclose alternative voting 
systems from applying to the first Gingles precondition. Id. at 363-64. 
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in the absence of the challenged structure or practice.243 
Focusing on the “potential to elect” portion of this precondition, 
Mulroy determined that the compactness portion need not be 
met.244 Rather, Mulroy urged for a substitute benchmark with a 
“threshold of exclusion” prong, which would afford minority 
voters the same opportunity—or “potential”—to elect their 
preferred candidate.245 In essence, Mulroy asserted that the first 
Gingles precondition was more flexible than it appeared or 
than it had been construed by the courts.246 But the Supreme 
Court has never framed the requirement as anything other 
than a majority-minority rule. 
There are difficulties with proposing a new Gingles 
benchmark for the first precondition to establish liability. First, 
as a practical matter, the current single-member district 
benchmark test of Gingles is straightforward. Mulroy 
acknowledged this.247 The plaintiff presents a “map of an 
illustrative majority-minority district to demonstrate the first 
Gingles prong of ‘compactness,’” and a court can rule easily on 
whether the first precondition is met.248 But, as Mulroy also 
noted, the threshold of exclusion benchmark is a simplistic 
formula to apply, too.249 This is crucial—the Bartlett Court 
recognized the importance of a clear, numerical rule (fifty 
percent VAP/CVAP) when it struck down the potential of a 
legally-mandated crossover district.250 One large problem with 
the idea of judicially enforceable crossover districts was the 
  
 243 See id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
 244 See id. at 368.  
 245 See id. at 369.  
 246 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993) (noting that the 
Gingles requirements “cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the 
nature of the claim”). 
 247 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 345. 
 248 Id. Mulroy recognizes that an idea to replace the Gingles compactness 
requirement would be met with criticism because the requirement “is an objective, 
easily quantifiable, ‘bright line’ standard which allows for easy judicial 
implementation.” Id. at 369. 
 249 Id. at 370-71 (“All that is needed to be known is the minority’s percentage 
of the jurisdiction’s population, the number of seats on the governing body in question, 
and the type of alternative electoral system requested in the plaintiffs’ complaint. From 
these three facts one would be able to calculate whether the plaintiff can make out a 
prima facie case of ‘potential to elect,’ as understood in Gingles.”).  
 250 Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1245 (2009) (“Unlike any of the 
standards proposed to allow crossover-district claims, the majority-minority rule relies 
on an objective, numerical test: Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the 
voting-age population in the relevant geographic area? That rule provides 
straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged with drawing district 
lines to comply with [section] 2.”).  
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necessity of the courts to engage in political questioning.251 
Cumulative voting, by contrast, does not demand that the 
courts delve into politics or line-drawing. Rather, it applies a 
simple formula to determine the remedy. Therefore, it, too, is a 
desirable standard for the judiciary. 
But to the extent that the “benchmark” for determining 
the sufficiency of the first Gingles precondition was never very 
exact—and thus perhaps open to interpretation—that has since 
changed after Bartlett. There was no precise bar by which to 
measure the exactitude of what constituted a majority within a 
given majority-minority district, and so the “threshold of 
exclusion” benchmark might have actually been a cleaner, 
more precise method by which to determine ability to elect. 
Bartlett, however, established a clear numerical threshold 
defining the “majority” under the first Gingles factor; in order 
for the majority-minority population to avail itself of an 
opportunity to elect its candidate of choice in section 2 
challenge, it must show it can constitute at least fifty percent of 
VAP/CVAP in a drawn district.252 Furthermore, the Court 
expressly noted in Bartlett that “[a]llowing crossover-district 
claims would require us to revise and reformulate the Gingles 
threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our [section] 2 
jurisprudence.”253 Indeed, while the refusal to reformulate the 
first Gingles precondition rested on the particular facts of 
Bartlett, it is telling in that the Court considers any change to 
Gingles’ preconditions to be offensive to stare decisis—thus, the 
first precondition, according to the Court, is not as flexible as 
once thought.254  
The argument might be made, however, that Bartlett 
need not foreclose completely the idea that single-member 
districts can be replaced by the threshold of exclusion within 
  
 251 Id. at 1244 (noting that if section 2 required crossover districts, the 
judiciary would be “in the untenable position of predicting many political variables and 
tying them to race-based assumptions”).  
 252 Id. at 1246 (noting that only a district with a minority population of more 
than fifty percent of the VAP/CVAP can provide a remedy to minority voters under 
section 2). It is perhaps worth noting that, while the Bartlett decision was rendered after 
the Port Chester case was decided, the majority-minority district in Port Chester proposed 
by the DOJ did, in fact, have both VAP and CVAP voting populations of over fifty percent. 
Mulroy argued that a minority population in a given subdivision could have a potential to 
elect its preferred candidate under the threshold of exclusion if the minority population 
was too geographically dispersed for the legislature draw a district with more than fifty 
percent minority VAP/CVAP. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out, supra note 118, at 1881. 
Bartlett requires such a district be drawn for the first Gingles precondition. 
 253 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1244. 
 254 See generally McLoughlin, supra note 49. 
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the first Gingles prong. As Mulroy has argued in the past, 
“[w]here the plaintiffs do not challenge the use of at-large 
elections per se, but instead some discrete feature of the 
particular at-large system being used, a different analysis 
obtains.”255 The challenge might be “to such electoral features as 
majority vote . . . [or] staggered term[] requirements,” which do 
not require single-member districts absolutely.256 Moreover, 
attaching the threshold of exclusion as a benchmark for the 
first Gingles precondition would not disrupt the other two 
Gingles preconditions.257 The Bartlett Court, in dicta, made a 
point of noting that using crossover districts as a benchmark 
within the first Gingles prong could cause tension with the 
third necessary Gingles precondition—that the white majority 
votes as a bloc.258 The threshold of exclusion, on the other hand, 
would not produce such a tension, and the third Gingles prong 
would still need to be met.  
Even if there exists the possibility that the threshold of 
exclusion could be used to replace the districting benchmark of 
the first Gingles prong, though, it still seems unlikely that the 
Court would adopt the threshold of exclusion as a replacement 
for the precise standard that the Bartlett Court set forth. 
b. Cumulative Voting as a Judicially Imposed Remedy 
While Bartlett might have defined an exact numerical 
for the purposes of liability under the first Gingles 
precondition, cumulative voting should still constitute a 
judicially enforceable and imposed remedial measure when the 
political subdivision at issue desires it. Indeed, after Bartlett, a 
political subdivision must take the first step of proving liability 
by showing potential majority-minority districts with a 
minority VAP/CVAP of more than fifty percent. Thereafter, 
courts should adopt the view—as the Port Chester Court did—
that the remedy and the benchmark need not be related. In 
this sense, the first Gingles precondition requires the existence 
only of a hypothetical benchmark for the purpose of measuring 
  
 255  Mulroy, supra note 12, at 365. 
 256 Id. at 355-56. 
 257 Id. at 373 (noting that “plaintiffs would still have to prove racial bloc voting”). 
 258  Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1244 (“Mandatory recognition of claims in which 
success for a minority depends upon crossover majority voters would create serious 
tension with the third Gingles requirement that the majority votes as a bloc to defeat 
minority-preferred candidates.”). 
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vote dilution, not an actual remedy, so the remedy should be 
viewed as a separate entity. In Holder v. Hall, Justice 
O’Connor articulated the difference between the two and 
explained that an  
alternative benchmark is often self-evident. In a challenge to a 
multi-member at-large system, for example, a court may compare it 
to a system of multiple single-member districts. Though there may 
be disagreements about the precise appropriate alternative practice 
in these cases, . . . there are at least some objectively determinable 
constraints on the dilution inquiry.259  
In other words, the first two preconditions merely 
contemplate an objective basis used to assess the vote-
dilution inquiry; they do not have to be seen as 
contemplating a remedy or the “precise appropriate 
alternative practice” that will ultimately be implemented.260 
There are, of course, cases that suggest a different 
interpretation, even diametrically opposed to the notion that 
one can separate the Gingles benchmark requirement from a 
remedial plan. On a rudimentary level, “any federal decree 
must be a tailored remedial response to illegality.”261 On its 
face, an understanding of this proposition tells us that the 
benchmark that determined illegality should be the benchmark 
used to cure that illegality. Other courts construe the 
benchmark dilemma in a similar manner. “The inquiries into 
remedy and liability . . . cannot be separated: A district court 
must determine as part of the Gingles threshold inquiry 
whether it can fashion a permissible remedy in the particular 
context of the challenged system.”262  
But if the first Gingles benchmark is inextricably linked 
to the remedy imposed, then, after Bartlett, the only plans 
political subdivisions could employ as remedial measures 
would be single-member districts with a minority VAP/CVAP of 
more than fifty percent. The potential foreclosure of alternative 
  
 259 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 260 See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 364 (citing SCLC v. Sessions, 
56 F.3d 1281, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995) (Hatchett, J., dissenting)) (“Under this analysis, a 
plaintiff who can satisfy the compactness requirement with an illustrative district (as 
well as the other Gingles preconditions and Senate factors) can potentially obtain an 
alternative system as relief.”). 
 261 LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 847 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 262 Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also 
Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 571 (8th Cir. 2010) (Smith, J., dissenting) 
(finding that “Bartlett’s explanation of the majority-minority rule with regard to 
liability directly affects the imposition of a [section] 2 remedy, as issues of liability and 
remedy are inextricably intertwined”). 
1712 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
voting systems again implicates Shaw and equal-protection 
violations. The Supreme Court—which has continually 
expressed its disdain for race-conscious line-drawing—would be 
better served by allowing for alternative voting practices as 
cures, so long as the plaintiffs in these cases meet all of the 
requirements of a vote-dilution claim at the liability phase, at 
least so long as the defendant jurisdiction desires the 
alternative system. The mandate, expressed by federal circuit 
courts of appeals, that the defendant political subdivision’s 
remedial plan should prevail whenever possible in section 2 
cases263 should trump any inkling that the liability benchmark 
and the remedial plan need be identical. This was precisely the 
case in Port Chester. At that juncture, after liability has been 
proved with district drawing and a numerical majority, the 
plaintiff has proved an opportunity to elect. If a section 2 
violation is then found, the qualities of cumulative voting that 
are most appealing—its easily applied numerical standard (the 
threshold of exclusion) and its imperviousness to an equal-
protection attack—are ideal for the remedy stage. Therefore, 
while some circuit courts of appeals have determined that 
liability and remedy are inextricably linked in section 2 cases, 
the Supreme Court has not.264 The courts would be better 
served, if restricted to numerical single-member districts in 
determining liability under Bartlett and Gingles, to 
contemplate less race-conscious remedies like cumulative 
voting. This is why it is imperative for the DOJ to define some 
initial standards concerning the circumstances under which 
cumulative voting can be used as a remedial measure.  
IV. PROPOSAL  
The DOJ must establish clear guidelines regarding the 
implementation of cumulative voting. In light of the recent 
Bartlett decision and the national attention the Port Chester 
case has received, it is an optimal time for the DOJ to define 
the circumstances under which cumulative voting should be 
considered an appropriate remedy for a section 2 violation.  
Undoubtedly, the DOJ should provide guidance about 
the educational program that should be implemented along 
with the cumulative voting system, which should be 
  
 263  See, e.g., Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 264 Cottier, 604 F.3d at 570-71 (“Admittedly, Bartlett concerned only the 
liability stage of a [section] 2 case, not the remedial stage.”). 
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comprehensive. This is evidenced by the all-inclusive 
educational program the DOJ demanded in Port Chester, along 
with notes in the DOJ’s preclearance objection letters and 
stances in recent litigation.265 The DOJ should also ensure it 
outlines precise measures that must be taken by bilingual 
communities (like Port Chester), which must ensure that 
populations of non-English speaking voters receive the 
attention and education necessary to understand the system—
which, of course, is more complex than other voting systems. 
The DOJ might consider devising its own educational manual 
about cumulative voting, so that voters are aware that it is 
currently a system in use in a number of jurisdictions, and so 
that voters can become familiar with alternative voting 
systems uniformly. Residents in political subdivisions where 
cumulative voting is implemented should be given sufficient 
information about applicable voting strategies. Moreover, the 
DOJ should also seek—most of all—to rid constituents of faulty 
notions: that cumulative voting violates the “one man, one 
vote” requirement, or that cumulative voting constitutes 
impermissible proportional representation.266 This education 
would not be done in vain; where the system has been 
implemented, voters seem to understand the process.267 
The DOJ should communicate aptly that the political 
subdivision endeavoring to implement the system should have 
a healthy fiscal budget. The hefty educational plan creates real 
costs, and the DOJ should asses the political subdivision’s 
  
 265 See, e.g., Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14 (“[M]ost important, 
consideration of any proposed implementation of [cumulative voting] must involve an 
analysis of the political sophistication of the local minority community and the 
likelihood of that community employing the necessary strategic voting. Where these 
factors are lacking, the cumulative . . . vote remed[y] will be viewed, understandably, 
as ineffective.”); see also U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City Sch. Dist., 
supra note 69, at 4 n.4 (“The United States believes the . . . cumulative voting proposal 
also fails because it does not provide an adequate plan to educate the voters or to 
implement the voting scheme.”). 
 266 See, e.g., Slatky, supra note 12. 
 267 See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 59, at 366 (“Fifty-seven local governments 
used cumulative voting as of 1997. The continued use of these methods for casting 
ballots provides strong evidence that they are not too complicated for the electorate.”).  
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capacity to launch the new system.268 For example, Port Chester 
spent roughly $300,000 on its implementation procedures.269  
The DOJ should also pronounce what it believes are the 
most advantageous size and demographic makeup of a political 
subdivision endeavoring to implement the system. Cumulative 
voting has most often been used in smaller political subdivisions, 
like school boards. Because of the more complicated nature of 
the system, and because cumulative voting requires voters to 
vote strategically—“plumping” their votes for a given candidate, 
or aggregating votes with others within their community—
implementation of the system in a large subdivision could suffer, 
at least where vote dilution is the violation.270  
Finally, the DOJ should be clear about the numerical 
figures it wants the political subdivision to use when 
calculating the threshold of exclusion, so that the minority 
voters in the district have a real “potential to elect” their 
preferred candidate. For example, in a recent section 2 case, 
the DOJ noted that the threshold of exclusion, as it relates to 
the real opportunity to elect, should be calculated based on the 
total electorate that actually showed up to the polls.271 The DOJ 
wanted the number assigned to the minority voting population 
to reflect historical data.272 The court, however, used a different 
figure: it assumed as a starting point for threshold of exclusion 
analysis that minority voters would go to the polls at two-
thirds the rate of non-minority voters.273 Therefore, the DOJ 
should ensure that, when calculating the threshold of 
exclusion, the minority population will have an actual, realistic 
opportunity to elect its preferred candidate. 
  
 268 A Port Chester Village spokesman noted, “We put so much emphasis on 
education—we may have spent $100 a voter—because we knew it would be critical to 
success . . . . [T]he next community can point to Port Chester and say ‘That’s how it’s 
done.’” Jim Fitzgerald, One Man, Six Votes: Port Chester Experiment Could Expand, 
NBC N.Y. (June 18, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/One-Man-
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 269 Semple, Trying to Make History, supra note 1. 
 270 Rick Pildes, The Return of Alternative Voting, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 
20, 2009, 9:21 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/2009_07.html (“Many 
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in local government elections, where I believe they might be most appropriate.”). 
 271  U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City Sch. Dist., supra note 69, at 6-7. 
 272 Id. 
 273 United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
Remedial schemes for section 2 violations are again in 
limbo after Bartlett. The Department of Justice should be more 
elastic in its acceptance of alternative voting schemes, and 
should be clearer about its position regarding cumulative 
voting and other alternative voting schemes. From the DOJ’s 
litigation strategy in Port Chester, we know successful 
implementations require, at the very least, education and 
assurance that the minority voters will have the potential to 
elect a seat once the remedial scheme is up and running.  
Courts are continually “required to confront a number of 
complex and essentially political questions in assessing claims 
of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act.”274 The “central 
difficulty” is often “determining a point of comparison against 
which dilution can be measured.”275 Perhaps, in the end, “[t]he 
matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases 
are questions of political philosophy, not questions of law. As 
such, they are not readily subjected to any judicially 
manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to 
select between competing theories.”276 Rather, the parameters 
for these political questions, and of alternative electoral 
systems, should be established by the DOJ, so that political 
subdivisions have a sense of how to best govern their citizens, 
and afford as many as possible a fair say in representation.  
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